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Abstract
We propose a set of consistency conditions that frontier efficiency measures should
meet to be most useful for regulatory analysis or other purposes.  The efficiency estimates
should be consistent in their efficiency levels, rankings, and identification of best and worst
firms, consistent over time and with competitive conditions in the market, and consistent with
standard nonfrontier measures of performance.  We provide evidence on these conditions by
evaluating and comparing efficiency estimates on U.S. bank efficiency from variants of all four
of the major approaches -- DEA, SFA, TFA, and DFA -- and find mixed results.
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To make informed policy decisions regarding financial institutions, regulators need to
have fairly accurate information about the likely effects of their decisions on the performance of
the institutions they regulate/supervise.
1  Specifically, the regulators of commercial banks,
thrifts, credit unions, and insurance companies should have some expert knowledge based on
rigorous empirical research regarding whether the mergers and acquisitions they are petitioned
to approve will result in higher or lower costs, and whether the increases in equity capital ratios
they may require will raise costs significantly and reduce the supply of intermediation services.
Similarly, regulatory authorities should be aware whether the observed managerial inefficiency
they may observe could raise the probability of financial institution failure substantially, and so
could be used to reallocate scarce supervisory resources to where they are most needed.  In
addition, regulators should have quantitative evidence on the performance effects of regulatory
restrictions on the interest rates and insurance premiums these institutions are allowed to pay
and receive, the prudential restrictions on the risks these firms are allowed to bear, the
geographic areas they are allowed to serve, and the types of financial services they are allowed
to offer.  If regulatory authorities do not have the benefit of quality information based upon
quantitative research regarding the performance effects of their actions, then their decisions
may have the unintended consequences of raising the costs of providing financial services to
the public, reducing the quantity or quality of these services, or increasing systemic risk.
In recent years, the academic research on the performance of financial institutions has
increasingly focused on frontier efficiency or X-efficiency, which measures deviations in
performance from that of “best-practice” firms on the efficient frontier, holding constant a
number of exogenous market factors such as the prices faced in local markets.  That is, the
frontier efficiency of an institution measures how well it performs relative to the predicted
performance of the “best” firms in the industry if these best firms were facing its same market
                                                          
1For convenience, we simply use the term “regulators” to refer to all lawmakers, supervisory
agencies, antitrust authorities, etc. that exercise any regulatory or supervisory authority over
financial institutions.conditions.  Frontier efficiency is superior for most regulatory and other purposes to the
standard financial ratios from accounting statements -- such as return on assets (ROA) or the
cost/revenue ratio -- that are commonly employed by regulators, financial institution managers,
and industry consultants to assess performance.  This is because frontier efficiency measures
use programming or statistical techniques to try to remove the effects of differences in input
prices and other exogenous market factors affecting the standard performance ratios in order to
obtain better estimates of the underlying performance of the managers.
The financial institution efficiency literature is both large and recent -- a review of 130
studies of financial institution frontier efficiency across 21 countries found that fully 116 were
written or published during 1992-1997 (Berger and Humphrey 1997).  Frontier inefficiency or X-
inefficiency of financial institutions has generally been found to consume a considerable portion
of costs on average, to be a much greater source of performance problems than either scale or
product mix inefficiencies, and to have a strong empirical association with higher probabilities of
financial institution failures over several years following the observation of substantial
inefficiency.
Frontier efficiency has been used extensively in regulatory analysis to measure the
effects of mergers and acquisitions, capital regulations, deregulation of deposit rates, removal
of geographic restrictions on branching and holding company acquisitions, etc. on financial
institution performance.  The main advantage of frontier efficiency over other indicators of
performance is that it is an objectively determined quantitative measure that removes the
effects of market prices and other exogenous factors that influence observed performance.
This allows the researcher to focus on the quantitative effects on costs, input use, etc. that
changes in regulatory policy are likely to engender.
Despite intense research efforts, there is no consensus on the best method or set of
methods for measuring frontier efficiency, and the choice of method may affect the policy
conclusions that are drawn from the analyses.  In the past twenty years, at least four main
frontier approaches have been developed to assess firm performance relative to some
empirically defined “best-practice” standard.  These are the nonparametric linear programmingapproach, often referred to as data envelopment analysis (DEA), and three parametric
econometric approaches -- the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), thick frontier approach
(TFA), and distribution-free approach (DFA).  These approaches differ in the assumptions they
make regarding the shape of the efficient frontier, the existence of random error, and (if random
error is allowed) the distributional assumptions imposed on the inefficiencies and random error
in order to disentangle one from the other.  As discussed below, these approaches also often
differ in whether the underlying concept analyzed is technological efficiency versus economic
efficiency, although this difference need not occur in practice.
In this paper, we argue that it is not necessary to have a consensus on which is the
single best frontier approach for measuring efficiency for the efficiencies to be useful for
regulatory analysis.  Instead, we propose a set of consistency conditions that efficiency
measures derived from the various approaches should meet to be most useful for regulators or
other decision makers. The efficiency estimates derived from the different approaches should
be consistent in their efficiency levels, rankings, and identification of best and worst firms,
consistent over time and with competitive conditions in the market, and consistent with standard
nonfrontier measures of performance.  Specifically, the consistency conditions are:
(i) the efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should have
comparable means, standard deviations, and other distributional properties;
(ii) the different approaches should rank the institutions in the approximately the same
order;
(iii) the different approaches should identify mostly the same institutions as “best
practice” and as “worst practice;”
(iv) all of the useful approaches should demonstrate reasonable stability over time, i.e.,
tend to consistently identify the same institutions as relatively efficient or inefficient
in different years, rather than varying markedly from one year to the next;
(v) the efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should be reasonably
consistent with competitive conditions in the market; and
(vi) the measured efficiencies from all of the useful approaches should be reasonably
consistent with standard nonfrontier performance measures, such as return on
assets or the cost/revenue ratio.Consistency conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) may be thought of as measuring the degree to
which the different approaches are mutually consistent, and conditions (iv), (v), and (vi) may be
thought of as measuring the degree to which the efficiencies generated by the different
approaches are consistent with reality or are believable.  The former are more helpful in
determining whether the different approaches will give the same answers to regulatory policy
questions or other queries, and the latter are more helpful in determining whether these
answers are likely to be correct.
   Specifically for the mutual-consistency conditions, if the approaches generate similar
distributions of efficiency as in condition (i), then the projected quantitative effects of regulatory
policies on performance would be more likely to be similar across the approaches.  If the
methods all rank the institutions in about the same order as in (ii), then regulatory authorities
would generally get the same answer when evaluating whether institutions that had undergone
mergers and other regulatory-influenced events had became more or less efficient as a result.
As a weaker condition than (ii), if the approaches at least found mostly the same institutions to
be in the highest and lowest efficiency groups, as in condition (iii), then regulatory authorities
could draw reasonable conclusions about which operating policies and procedures or
managerial control structures were “best-practice” and “worst-practice,” and design their
policies accordingly.  For example, if it were determined that branch banking or universal
banking were best practices that consistently maximized measured efficiency across all the
approaches, then regulators might be less inclined to put restrictions on branch expansion or
circumscribe banking powers.  Importantly, all of the efficiency approaches could be mutually
consistent as in conditions (i), (ii), and (iii), but still not be very useful if they are not realistic or
believable as in conditions (iv), (v), and (vi).
For the consistent-with-reality or believability conditions, if the efficiency scores are
stable over time as in condition (iv) instead of the efficiencies bouncing up and down
dramatically from year to year, this would be consistent with the likely pattern of true managerial
efficiencies over time.  Management usually does not turn over often, and even when this
occurs, it is difficult to implement new policies and procedures quickly.  Similarly, some ofefficiency differences may arise from differences in technology that are embodied in durable
plant and equipment that may be difficult and costly to replace in the short term.  Thus, only in
exceptional cases would it be likely that efficiencies would fluctuate markedly over short periods
of time.  If condition (iv) were met, then authorities could also be more confident that their
policies targeted toward either very inefficient or very efficient firms would still generally identify
them correctly after normal policy and implementation lags for regulatory actions.  In addition,
competitive conditions may help limit the range of believable efficiencies in the market, as in
condition (v).  For instance, if the entry barriers to the industry or local market are not too steep
and the market is reasonably unconcentrated, then condition (v) suggests that most firms that
remain in business for a long period of time should be reasonably efficient, since competition
should drive most of the very inefficient firms out of the industry.  Finally, if the efficiencies
generated by the different approaches all were positively related to standard financial ratio
measures of performance as in condition (vi), then authorities could be more confident that the
measured efficiencies were accurate indicators of actual accomplishment, and not just artifacts
of the assumptions of the efficiency approaches.  It is expected that accurate efficiency
measures would have positive rank-order correlations with the standard nonfrontier
performance measures, but the correlations should be far from 1.00 because the standard
measures embody not only the efficiencies, but also the effects of differences in input prices
and other exogenous variables over which financial institution managers have no little or no
control.
There is some prior evidence on these points, but there has never been a
comprehensive study of financial institutions that has examined all six of these consistency
conditions for regulatory usefulness and applied them to all four of the major frontier
approaches.  The prior evidence suggests that the efficiency scores from the different
approaches often yield quite different distributions of measured efficiencies, contrary to
condition (i).  For example, a comparison of 118 average annual efficiency values from 66
studies of U.S. banks indicated that nonparametric methods such as DEA yielded a lower mean
and higher standard deviation than did the parametric methods such as SFA, TFA, and DFA(Berger and Humphrey 1997, Table 2).
2  However, these studies differed in their choice of
efficiency concept (technological efficiency versus economic efficiency), samples of banks, time
periods chosen, specifications of inputs and outputs, functional forms, and employment of
different techniques within each approach, and so do not provide a good experimental design
for evaluating whether the efficiency approaches are consistent. For evaluating consistency, it
is necessary to hold these other factors constant and apply multiple efficiency methods to the
same data set.
There are a few such studies that applied two or more methods to the same data set,
and these are reviewed in Section III below.  As will be shown, this evidence is very limited at
present, and the results are quite mixed across studies.  The studies sometimes find the
average efficiencies to be similar and sometimes dissimilar across the approaches, and
sometimes consistent and sometimes inconsistent with market competitive conditions, yielding
ambiguous evidence regarding conditions (i) and (v).  These studies have also yielded mixed
evidence on the issues of whether the different efficiency approaches rank the best and worst
institutions similarly, as in conditions (ii) and (iii).  There is also very little evidence on the
stability of efficiency, and whether measured efficiencies rank firms in the same order as
standard nonfrontier measures of performance, as in conditions (iv) and (vi).
The main purpose of the current study is to add to this limited information set by
providing specific evidence on all of the six conditions for regulatory usefulness by evaluating
and comparing new efficiency estimates from all four of the major approaches.  To be
complete, we employ multiple techniques within each of the four approaches, using single-
period and panel methods, for a total of nine efficiency techniques evaluated.  To be sure that
the applications are comparable, all nine techniques use the same efficiency concept
(economic efficiency), the same sample of banks, the same time period, the same
specifications of inputs and outputs, and (for the parametric methods) the same functional form.
To be sure that the results do not depend upon any one particular economic environment of the
                                                          
2The mean and standard deviation of the nonparametric efficiency scores were 72% and 17%,
respectively, as opposed to 84% and 6%, respectively, for the parametric estimates.banking industry or any peculiarities of any one small group of banks, we estimate the average
efficiency over time of a panel of 683 banks over a 12-year period during which there were
significant changes in the banking industry.  This experimental design helps assure that the
observed differences in efficiency scores reflect the effects of the differences in the
measurement techniques, rather than any of these other factors.
Our examination of the consistency conditions is in the spirit of Charnes, Cooper, and
Sueyoshi (1988), who advocated the “methodological cross-checking” of results that have
policy importance.  Our application is also in concordance with Leamer and Leonard (1983) and
Leamer (1994), who emphasized assessing the “fragility” of one’s results by reporting the
results of diverse or “extreme” models to better understand the implications of one’s analysis.
We believe that our estimation of nine different models using 12 years of data, and applying all
six consistency requirements to the nine models qualifies as “extreme,” and if there is “fragility”
in the findings across efficiency approaches, we are likely to find it.  As well, if there are
dimensions of consistency in the frontier efficiency approaches, we should also be able to find
some evidence of these consistencies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II outlines the four frontier
efficiency approaches, and Section III reviews earlier studies that compared two or more
approaches.  Section IV describes the data set and model specifications, and Section V applies
the consistency conditions to the nine efficiency techniques.  Section VI pulls all of this
information together and draws some conclusions about the consistency of the various frontier
efficiency approaches for use in regulatory analysis, and discusses some avenues for future
research.
II.  The Four Frontier Efficiency Approaches
As noted above, the four frontier approaches differ in the assumptions made about the
shape of the frontier, the treatment of random error, and the distributions assumed for
inefficiency and random error.  These methods also often differ in whether the underlying
concept of efficiency is technological or economic, with the nonparametric DEA studies usually
measuring technological efficiency and the parametric SFA, TFA, and DFA studies usuallymeasuring economic efficiency.  In this section, we briefly review the methods, focusing on the
underlying concepts and assumptions, rather than the technical details of the estimation
methods which have already been well-explained in several comprehensive surveys.
3
We begin by discussing the efficiency concepts, and then assess the four frontier
approaches.  Technological efficiency, or technical efficiency as it is sometimes called, focuses
on levels of inputs relative to levels of outputs.  To be technologically efficient, a firm must either
minimize its inputs given outputs or maximize its outputs given inputs.  Economic efficiency is a
broader concept than technological efficiency, in that economic efficiency also involves
optimally choosing the levels and mixes of inputs and/or outputs based on reactions to market
prices.  To be economically efficient, a firm has to choose its input and/or output levels and
mixes so as to optimize an economic goal, usually cost minimization or profit maximization.
Economic efficiency requires technological efficiency as well as allocative efficiency -- i.e, the
optimal inputs and/or outputs are chosen based on both the production technology and the
relative prices in the market.  It is quite plausible that some firms that are relatively
technologically efficient are relatively economically inefficient and vice versa, depending upon
the relationship between managers’ abilities to use the best technology and their abilities to
respond to market signals.  Therefore, the use of the two different efficiency concepts may give
significantly different rankings of firms, even for a given frontier approach.  Technological
efficiency scores will also tend to be higher than economic efficiency scores on average, all else
equal, because economic efficiency sets a higher standard that includes allocative efficiency.
Technological efficiency requires only input and output data, but economic efficiency
also requires price data.  Most of the early nonparametric frontier models (e.g., Charnes,
Cooper, and Rhodes 1978) as well as some of the early parametric frontier models (e.g.,
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977) focused on technological efficiency.  In fact, DEA was
developed specifically for measuring technological efficiency in the public and not-for-profit
                                                          
3 See, for example, the surveys by Banker, Charnes, Cooper, Swarts, and Thomas (1989),
Bauer (1990), Seiford and Thrall (1990), Ali and Seiford (1993), Greene (1993), Grosskopf
(1993), Lovell (1993), or Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1994).sectors, where prices may not be available or reliable, and the assumption of cost minimizing or
profit maximizing behavior may not be appropriate (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 1978).
However, in recent efficiency analyses, there is usually a difference in the efficiency
concept employed between the nonparametric and parametric approaches.  Most
nonparametric DEA studies continue to apply technological efficiency to inputs and outputs,
although a few studies do use cost-based DEA (e.g., Ferrier and Lovell 1990, Ferrier,
Grosskopf, Hayes, and Yaisawarng 1993, Cummins and Zi 1998).  In contrast, virtually all
recent parametric SFA, TFA, and DFA studies employ prices and examine economic
efficiency.
4  This means that in most cases, efficiency scores generated by DEA are not fully
comparable to those of SFA, TFA, and DFA.
We argue here for the appropriateness of economic efficiency for use in the regulatory
analysis of financial institutions.  Price data do exist for financial institutions, and cost
minimization and profit maximization are likely important behavioral objectives.  Moreover, the
economic inefficiencies of financial institutions are better measures for regulators to use in
evaluating the costs and benefits to society of various policies than are the technological
inefficiencies, which do not put value weights on the inputs wasted or outputs not produced.
Using technological efficiency in place of economic efficiency, thus neglecting allocative
efficiency, would likely increase the level of average efficiency (condition i), affect the overall
rankings of financial institutions and the identification of best practice and worst practice firms
(conditions ii and iii), and may reduce the consistency of measured efficiency with the state of
competition in banking markets and with standard nonfrontier measures of performance
(conditions v and vi), which generally depend on economic reactions to market prices.
Therefore, in all the empirical applications in this paper (including DEA), we incorporate price
data and employ the concept of economic optimization.
                                                          
4  The move to economic efficiency by the parametric studies may have been motivated in large
part by another concern -- the need to account for multiple outputs.  Unlike with DEA, this
cannot be accomplished in a single parametric production function, but can be handled in cost
or profit functions, which would normally include prices as arguments.  However, with recent
advances in distance function estimation, multiple outputs can now be handled in production
settings.We choose cost minimization over profit maximization because it is a more commonly
specified and accepted efficiency concept in the literature, and because there are problems
measuring output prices from the bank Call Reports during the first part of our sample (prior to
1984).  Ideally, both cost and profit specifications would be employed and compared, but
examining our six consistency conditions over nine different efficiency techniques already seem
to strain the very limits of space and time.  We recommend that future investigations follow this
path.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  Nonparametric approaches to measuring
efficiency, represented here by DEA (but also including the Free Disposal Hull or FDH), use
linear programming techniques.  In the usual radial forms of DEA that are based on
technological efficiency, efficient firms are those for which no other firm or linear combination of
firms produces as much or more of every output (given inputs) or uses as little or less of every
input (given outputs).  The DEA efficient frontier is composed of these undominated firms and
the piecewise linear segments that connect the set of input/output combinations of these firms,
yielding a convex production possibilities set.
5  In the version of DEA we apply here which is
based on economic efficiency, efficient firms are those which minimize the cost of producing
their observed outputs given the best-practice technology and input prices.
6  An obvious benefit
of DEA is that it does not require the explicit specification of a functional form and so imposes
very little structure on the shape of the efficient frontier.
A potential problem of “self-identifiers” and “near-self-identifiers” may arise when DEA is
applied. Under the usual radial forms of DEA, each firm can only be compared to firms on the
frontier or their linear combinations with the same or more of every output (given inputs) or the
same or fewer of every input (given outputs).  In addition, other constraints are often imposed
on DEA problems which require comparability with linear combinations of other firms.   Other
                                                          
5 DEA presumes that linear substitution is possible between observed input combinations on a
piecewise linear frontier while FDH presumes that no substitution is possible.
6 In applying DEA, we followed procedures outlined in Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994).
Variable returns to scale were permitted through use of a side summation restriction in the
linear program.constraints specified in financial institutions research include quality controls, such as the
number of branches or average bank account size, or environmental variables, such as controls
for state regulatory environment.  These other constraints potentially apply to both the radial
and cost-based forms of DEA.  Having to match other firms in so many dimensions can result in
firms being measured as highly efficient solely because no other firms or few other firms (and
their linear combinations) have comparable values of inputs, outputs, or other constrained
variables.
7  That is, some firms may be self-identified as 100% efficient not because they
dominate any other firms, but simply because no other firms or linear combination of firms are
comparable in so many dimensions.  Similarly, other firms may be measured as 100% efficient
or nearly 100% efficient because there are only a few other observations with which they are
comparable.  The problem of self-identifiers and near-self-identifiers most often arises when
there are a small number of observations relative to the number of inputs, outputs, and other
constraints, so that a large proportion of the observations are difficult to match in all
dimensions.  Some empirical evidence from the literature on this point is presented below.
Our DEA application tries to minimize the self-identifier problem in three ways.  First, we
use input prices in a cost-based DEA methodology.  In the usual radial input-based (output-
based) DEA applications, input mix (output mix) is held constant, so firms with unusual input
(output) mixes may be found to be self-identifiers or near-self-identifiers. We can compare any
input mix in our application by combining input prices and quantities and comparing total costs,
rather than having to compare firms in every input dimension.  Second, we do not impose any
extra constraints on our DEA problem, so firms only have to minimize costs relative to other
firms or linear combinations of firms producing the same output bundle.  By specifying costs
and by imposing no extra constraints, we can only have self-identifiers or near-self-identifiers to
the extent that the output bundles of some banks cannot be easily replicated by linear
                                                          
7 While new procedures have been devised to test for and limit extraneous specification of
inputs and outputs or other constraints (e.g., Lovell and Pastor 1997), their application is not yet
common.combinations of other banks.
8  Third, we use a relatively large number of observations relative
to the small number of constraints in our DEA problems, so that most firms will have quite a few
linear combinations of other firms that are comparable.  Specifically, we solve cost minimizing
linear programming problems with data on 683 observations for each single year (DEA-S),
specifying 4 outputs and no other constraints.  We also combine all 12 years of data into a
panel (DEA-P), where the reference set is constant over the entire period, for a total of 8196
observations.
9
One potential problem with DEA that we do not try to solve is that DEA usually does not
allow for random error due to measurement problems associated with using accounting data,
good or bad luck that temporarily raises or lowers inputs or outputs, or specification error such
as excluded inputs and outputs and imposing the piecewise linear shape on the frontier.  Any
random errors that do exist may be counted as differences in efficiency by DEA.  Presumably,
this would result in lower average efficiency, as there will be more dispersion in the data, unless
there is some unusual statistical association between random error and “true” efficiency.  This
effect may be quite large, since the random error in a single observation on the efficient frontier
will affect the measured efficiency of all of the firms that are compared to any linear
combination on the frontier involving this firm.
10
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA).  The parametric methods -- SFA, TFA, and DFA
-- have a disadvantage relative to the nonparametric methods of having to impose more
structure on the shape of the frontier by specifying a functional form for it.  As noted above, we
choose a cost function specification here.  However, an advantage of the parametric methods is
                                                          
8The comparability problems for both inputs and outputs could be solved by using a profit-based
DEA approach (e.g., Färe and Whittaker 1996).
9In our empirical application of cost-based DEA,  none of the banks that were identified as
technologically efficient were found to be cost efficient.  This suggests that including prices and
accounting for allocative inefficiency helps ameliorate the potential self-identifier problem.
10 There are some efforts to deal with random error in DEA using bootstrapping to gain
statistical inference (e.g., Simar and Wilson 1995, Ferrier and Hirschberg 1997) and chance-
constrained programming to reduce the effects of noise (e.g., Land, Lovell, and Thore 1993).
See Grosskopf (1996) for a survey of these approaches.that they allow for random error, so these methods are less likely to misidentify measurement
error, transitory differences in cost, or specification error as inefficiency.  The primary challenge
in implementing the parametric methods is determining how best to separate random error from
inefficiency, since neither of them are observed.  The parametric methods SFA, TFA, and DFA
differ in the distributional assumptions imposed to accomplish this disentanglement.
SFA employs a composed error model in which inefficiencies are assumed to follow an
asymmetric distribution, usually the half-normal, while random errors are assumed to follow a
symmetric distribution, usually the standard normal (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 1977).  That is,
the error term from the cost function is given by   = µ +  , where µ   0 represents inefficiency and
follows a half-normal distribution, and   represents random error and behaves according to a
normal distribution.  The reasoning is that inefficiencies cannot subtract from costs, and so
must be drawn from a truncated distribution, whereas random error can both add and subtract
costs, and so may be drawn from a symmetric distribution.  Both the inefficiencies µ and the
random errors   are assumed to be orthogonal to the input prices, output quantities, and any
other cost function regressors specified.  The efficiency of each firm is based on the conditional
mean (or mode) of inefficiency term µ, given the residual which is an estimate of the composed
error  .
 Greene (1990) and others have argued that alternative distributions for inefficiency may
be more appropriate than the half-normal, and the application of different distributions
sometimes do matter to the average efficiencies found for financial institutions (e.g., Yuengert
1993, Mester 1996, Berger and DeYoung 1997).  We argue here that any distributional
assumptions simply imposed without basis in fact are quite arbitrary and could lead to
significant error in estimating individual firm efficiencies.  For example, the half-normal
assumption on the inefficiencies µ imposes that most of the firms are clustered near full
efficiency, but there is no theoretical reason why inefficiencies could not be more evenly
distributed, or distributed close to symmetrically like the assumed distribution of the random
error.  In fact, prior studies using the DFA approach (described below) -- which imposes noshape on the distribution of inefficiencies -- suggested  that the inefficiencies behaved more like
symmetric normal distributions than half-normals (Bauer and Hancock 1993, Berger 1993).
11
Despite these potential problems with measuring the levels of efficiency, one positive
aspect of the SFA approach is that it will always rank the efficiencies of the firms in the same
order as their cost function residuals, no matter which specific distributional assumptions are
imposed.  That is, firms with lower costs for a given set of input prices, output quantities, and
any other cost function regressors will always be ranked as more efficient, since the conditional
mean or mode of µ (given the estimate of the residual  ) is always increasing in the size of the
residual.  This property of SFA has intuitive appeal for a measure of performance for regulatory
purposes -- a firm is measured as high in the efficiency rankings if it keeps costs relatively low
for its given exogenous conditions.  This is likely to prove helpful in meeting our consistency
conditions, which are primarily based on rank orderings.
In our empirical application of SFA, we use the half-normal - normal assumptions on the
inefficiencies and random error, since these are the most common assumptions in the
literature, and leave examination of our consistency conditions for other distributions for future
research efforts.  Similar to DEA-S and DEA-P, we apply SFA to both each single year of data
separately (SFA-S) and to the 12-year panel as a whole (SFA-P).  SFA-S allows the coefficients
of the translog cost function to vary over time, while the SFA-P holds the slope coefficients fixed
over time and allows the cost function intercepts to vary over time with changes in technology,
regulatory environment, and the macroeconomy.
Thick Frontier Approach (TFA).  TFA uses the same functional form for the frontier
cost function as SFA, but is based on a regression that is estimated using only the ostensibly
                                                          
11To investigate this issue further, we tested the distributions of efficiency scores from all nine
techniques employed here for symmetry using the nonparametric test proposed by D'Agostino,
Balanger and D'Agostino (1990).  In all cases, the null hypothesis of symmetry was rejected.
This is not surprising for the SFA results, since an asymmetric distribution was imposed on
these scores, but the other seven rejections suggest that the underlying efficiencies may not be
distributed close to symmetrically as was found in the prior studies.best performers in the data set -- those in the lowest average cost quartile for their size class.
12
Parameter estimates from this estimation are then used to obtain estimates of best-practice
cost for all of the firms in the data set (Berger and Humphrey 1991).  Banks in the lowest
average cost quartile are assumed to have above-average efficiency and to form a “thick
frontier.”
As it is usually implemented, TFA assumes that deviations from predicted performance
values within the highest and lowest performance quartiles of firms represent only random
error, while deviations in predicted performance between the highest and lowest average-cost
quartiles represent only inefficiencies (a special case of composed error) plus exogenous
differences in the regressors.  Measured inefficiencies thus are embedded in the difference in
predicted costs between the lowest and highest cost quartiles. This difference may occur in
either the intercepts or in the slope parameters.
In most applications, TFA gives an estimate of efficiency differences between the best
and worst quartile to indicate the general level of overall efficiency, but does not provide point
estimates of efficiency for all individual firms.  In our application, we need to obtain efficiency
estimates for each bank in each time period so that we can compare these estimates to our
other frontier efficiency methods.  This requires an adjustment.  The thick frontier is estimated
from data limited to only the lowest cost quartile of banks for each size class (as is standard).  A
separate efficiency term for every bank (including banks not in the thick frontier) is calculated
using a method very similar to the DFA estimates described below.   The estimated residuals
for the entire sample are calculated and it is assumed that the inefficiency disturbances are
uncorrelated with the regressors, so that a separate intercept for each bank can be recovered
as the mean of its residuals.  The most efficient 1% of the sample (7 banks) are assumed to be
fully efficient and their average residuals are truncated to be at the 1% point of the sample
                                                          
12 Banks are first stratified into 8 asset size classes and their average cost over the entire time
period (measured here as total cost per dollar of assets) is computed.  Those banks in each
size class with the lowest average cost form the subset of the data used to estimate the thick
frontier for each year separately or for all years together.  This ensures that an equal number of
banks of all size classes are included in the estimation.distribution, and the efficiency of each bank is determined from the difference from the frontier
in these average residuals.  The TFA efficiency estimates from the panel data set (TFA-P) are
based on one set of parameter estimates over the entire time period (corrected for first-order
serial correlation), and the TFA efficiency estimates for each year (TFA-S) estimate the cost
function parameters separately for each year.
As was the case for SFA, the levels of efficiency generated by TFA are potentially
suspect, since they are based on rather arbitrary assumptions -- that the lowest average cost
quartile within each size class is an adequate “thick frontier” of efficient firms, etc.
Nevertheless, there are again reasons for optimism regarding the rank orderings generated by
TFA.  Since the efficiency orderings are determined by cost function residuals after controlling
for input prices, output quantities, and possibly other factors, they have intuitive appeal, and are
likely to be very consistent with the SFA estimates and other measures of performance.
Distribution-Free Approach (DFA).  DFA specifies a functional form for the cost
function as does SFA and TFA, but DFA separates inefficiencies from random error in a
different way.  It does not impose a specific shape on the distribution of efficiency (as does
SFA), nor does it impose that deviations within one group of firms are all random error and
deviations between groups are all inefficiencies (as does TFA).  Instead, DFA assumes that
there is a “core” efficiency or average efficiency for each firm that is constant over time, while
random error tends to average out over time (Schmidt and Sickles 1984, Berger 1993).  Unlike
the other approaches, a panel data set is required, and therefore only panel estimates of
efficiency over the entire time interval are available (DFA-P).  These estimates may be derived
using three different techniques.
The first DFA technique, DFA-P WITHIN, is a fixed-effects model which estimates
inefficiency from the value of a firm-specific dummy variable (derived by estimating with all the
cost function variables measured as deviations from firm-specific means).  Efficiency is
estimated using the deviation from the most efficient firm’s intercept term.  A single set of
parameters are obtained so inefficiency is fixed over time.  However, since inefficiency is no
longer a separately specified element in a composed error term, we do not need an assumptionthat inefficiency is uncorrelated with the regressors (as in SFA) and we adjust for possible first-
order serial correlation.
The second DFA technique, DFA-P GLS, applies generalized least squares to panel
data, obtains a single set of parameters, assumes that bank inefficiencies are fixed over time,
13
and that inefficiency is uncorrelated with the regressors.  In our cost function, which is also
corrected for first-order serial correlation, a separate intercept for each firm is recovered from
the panel estimates as the average residual for that firm over the time period.  The firm with the
smallest average residual is presumed to be the most efficient firm and the inefficiency of all the
other firms is measured relative to this benchmark.
The third DFA technique, DFA-P TRUNCATED, estimates the cost function separately
for each year.  The efficiency estimates are based on the average residuals for each bank.
Since some noise might also be persistent over time, we follow Berger (1993) and truncate the
residuals at both the upper and lower 1% of the distribution, thus limiting the effects of extreme
average residuals at both ends.
As with the other efficiency approaches, there is concern that the levels of the DFA
efficiency estimates may be influenced by the somewhat arbitrary assumptions.  The
measurement of the “core” efficiency means that efficiency variations over time for an individual
firm tend to be  averaged out with the random error.   DFA also implicitly assumes that
inefficiency is the only time-invariant fixed effect.  If there are other factors that are persistently
affecting a firm’s costs that are not included in the regression model, such as being in a high-
crime location, this may be counted as inefficiency (although this would affect all the other
frontier approaches as well).
Nonetheless, similar to SFA and TFA approaches, DFA is intuitively appealing as a
measure of economic performance because it is based on keeping costs low for a given set of
outputs and input prices over a long period of time and over many changes in economic
                                                          
13 This assumption is not strictly necessary.  Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar
(1990), and Battese and Coelli (1992) generalized the approach to allow inefficiencies to vary
over time, but in a structured manner.conditions.  We therefore expect the DFA efficiency ranks to be highly correlated with SFA and
TFA ranks and other measures of bank performance.
III.  Results from Earlier Efficiency Comparisons
Although there is a large literature on financial institution efficiency, there is not much
information available on our consistency conditions because most studies applied a single
efficiency approach and these conditions are best analyzed by comparing the application of
multiple approaches to a single data set.  A few studies did compare multiple techniques,
usually applying two efficiency methods to the same data set.  The comparisons of bank
efficiencies using more than one approach include Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Bauer, Berger,
and Humphrey (1993), Hasan and Hunter (1996), Berger and Mester (1997), Eisenbeis, Ferrier,
and Kwan (1997), Resti (1997), and Berger and Hannan (forthcoming).
14  We briefly examine
some of the evidence from these studies here.
15
The studies by Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey (1993), Hasan and Hunter (1996), Berger
and Mester (1997), and Berger and Hannan (forthcoming) compared estimates using two or
more of the parametric approaches.  In most cases, these studies found that average
efficiencies were comparable and reasonably consistent with competitive conditions in the
banking industry -- supporting consistency conditions (i) and (v) above -- but there were
exceptions.  Hasan and Hunter (1996) found SFA average efficiency values to be much higher
than TFA, .81 versus .67, respectively, and Berger and Hannan (forthcoming) found SFA
average efficiencies of .92 to be quite a bit higher than the .70 average for DFA.  All of these
studies found that the parametric approaches tended to rank the banks similarly and identify the
same ones as highly efficient and inefficient -- supporting consistency conditions (ii) and (iii) --
but again there were differences of degree.  For example, Berger and Mester (1997) found a
rank-order correlation of .988 between SFA and DFA efficiencies, but Bauer, Berger, and
                                                          
14 A few frontier model comparisons have also been made using data for other financial
institutions, such as bank branches (Giokas 1991), insurance firms (Fecher, Kessler, Perelman,
and Pestieau 1993, Yuengert 1993, Cummins and Zi 1998), mutual funds (Ferrier and Philpot
1994), and Federal Reserve offices (Bauer and Hancock 1993).
15 Some additional summary details may be found in Berger and Humphrey (1997).Humphrey (1993) found that the two methods identified the same banks in the most and least
efficient 25% of the banks 38% of the time and 46% of the time, respectively, not all that much
higher than the 25% correspondence that would be expected by chance alone.  When
consistency conditions (iv) and (vi) were looked at in these and other studies, the limited
evidence suggested that the parametric approaches appeared to be yield efficiencies that
persisted over several years (e.g., Berger and Humphrey 1991,1992, Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and
Kwan 1997, DeYoung 1997), and these efficiencies were related in the expected way (although
not always strongly) with standard, nonfrontier measures of performance such as return on
assets (e.g., Berger and Humphrey 1991, Berger and Mester 1997, Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and
Kwan 1997).
Perhaps more interesting are the comparisons of bank efficiencies between
nonparametric and parametric approaches, which are really much more dissimilar from each
other than the parametric approaches are from one another.  DEA and SFA were compared by
Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and Kwan (1997), and Resti (1997).  These
studies reported fairly close average efficiencies generated by the two approaches.  However,
this belies the potential problem that the levels of efficiency under DEA may be sensitive to
“self-identifiers” or “near-self-identifiers” when there are too few observations relative to the
number of constraints in DEA. There is some empirical evidence that this problem may have
occurred.  For example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) found that the average efficiency level rose
from 54% to 83% when constraints on number of branches and average account sizes were
added to the model, keeping the same number of observations.  Since the average efficiency
for SFA was 79% and the average efficiency for DEA is somewhere between very low (54%)
and relatively high (83%), the question of whether DEA and SFA yield similar distributions of
efficiency that are consistent with competitive conditions in the banking industry -- as in
consistency conditions (i) and (v) -- remains open.
16  With regard to consistent rankings -- as in
                                                          
16 Additional empirical evidence on this question comes from studies of bank branches, where
there are often small numbers of observations employed in DEA analyses.  For example,
several DEA studies of bank branches used 35 or fewer observations and large numbers of
inputs and outputs and usually found most branches to be either 100% efficient or very close toconditions (ii) and (iii) -- the results from the literature are contradictory.  Resti (1997) found
very high rank-order correlations between DEA and SFA of .73 to .89, and Eisenbeis, Ferrier,
and Kwan (1997) found fairly high rank correlations ranging between .44 and .59, but Ferrier
and Lovell (1990) found rank-order correlation of only .02, which was not significantly different
from zero.  With respect to consistency conditions (iv) and (vi), the very small amount of
evidence suggested consistency over time, and very low, but positive correlation with
nonfrontier measures of performance (Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and Kwan 1997).
17
Thus, the evidence is quite limited and sometimes contradictory on the extent to which
the efficiency approaches pass our consistency conditions for use in regulatory analysis, or
which subset of them may pass and which may fail.  We therefore proceed with our empirical
analysis of the four major methods using nine techniques applied to a large data set of banks
over an extended period of time in order add to the evidence.
IV.  Data and Specification Issues
Consistent with the spirit of Charnes, Cooper, and Sueyoshi (1988), Leamer and
Leonard (1983), and Leamer (1994) -- who argued for using diverse or extreme conditions for
evaluating models -- we choose a long and turbulent time period with many regulatory changes
                                                                                                                                                                                          
it (Sherman and Gold 1985, Parkan 1987, Oral and Yolalan 1990, Vassiglou and Giokas 1990,
Giokas 1991, and Pastor 1993), whereas a DFA study found much lower average efficiencies
(Berger, Leusner, and Mingo 1997).
17 There is also some mixed evidence regarding the consistency of estimates within the same
technique applied to the same data set, where some of the assumptions or methods are
altered.  Some of these studies found strong consistency.  For example, Berger and Mester
(1997) found the DFA efficiency estimates to be robust to most changes in specification,
Maudos (1996) found very high rank-order correlations of efficiencies generated using different
distributional assumptions on the inefficiencies under SFA (.86 to .99), and Ferrier, Kerstens,
and Vanden Eeckaut (1994) obtained correlations between .87 and .99 when applying  four
different radial and nonradial DEA procedures.  However, other studies found less consistency.
For example, Berger and DeYoung (1997) found the average efficiencies to differ significantly
when the specifications of the inefficiency distribution and the functional form for the cost
function under SFA were altered, DeBorger, Ferrier, and Kerstens (forthcoming) compared
radial and nonradial technical efficiency using input-based and output-based FDH and found
rank correlations to vary substantially between .32 and .96, and DeYoung (1998) found very
different identification of the best and worst performance groups under TFA, depending upon
whether average costs versus supervisory ratings of management (the M in CAMEL) was used
to determine the groups.and many changes in market conditions for evaluating our consistency conditions. Our data set
is composed of 683 U.S. banks over the 12-period 1977-88.  All banks have over $100 million
in assets, come from branch-banking states, and were in continuous operation over the entire
period.  As a group, the banks account for over two-thirds of all assets in the U.S. banking
system.  In addition, since all states now allow branch banking, our results may be taken as
fairly representative of the banking system as a whole.
18
This time period is one of many changes in the U.S. banking industry.  During the late
1970s, rapid inflation and financial market innovation in the areas of cash management and
money market mutual funds expanded competition in bank corporate and consumer markets
from less-regulated financial intermediaries, who were not subject to restrictions on deposit
rates.  In the early 1980s, deposit interest rates and account types at banks and savings and
loans were substantially deregulated and bank charters became more freely issued, leading to
higher costs and further competition among financial institutions.  As well, 20 of the 51 states
(District of Columbia counted as a state) either relaxed or eliminated remaining geographic
restrictions on branching within the state, and 43 of the 51 removed barriers to interstate
banking through holding company acquisitions during this period (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise
1995, Table B6).  In addition, the entry of foreign banks into the market for nonfarm,
nonfinancial corporate debt during this period dramatically reduced the market share of U.S.
banks and likely reduced margins on the loans that domestic banks continued to make.  This
time interval also witnessed a substantial amount of technological and financial innovation,
starting with the substitution of ATMs for human tellers in the late 1970s, and the development
and refinement of derivative contracts and other products of financial engineering during the
                                                          
18 If failed banks had been included in the data set, it is likely that our efficiencies would have
been lower on average.  Failing banks and thrifts typically have lower than average efficiency
levels than other banks, although it is a matter of some controversy the extent to which the
inefficiencies cause the failures versus high costs created by dealing with problem loans just
before failure cause measured efficiency to be downwardly biased (e.g., Berger and Humphrey
1992, Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register 1993, Hermalin and Wallace 1994, Barr, Seiford,
and Siems 1994, Berger and DeYoung 1997).1980s.  As a result of all of these changes, many banks performed well, many performed
poorly, and a total of over 800 banks failed over this period.
 Thus, the period 1977-88 for U.S. banks is almost an ideal interval to determine how
the different frontier models identify and measure bank efficiency over a variety of extreme
conditions.  As well, it is under such extreme conditions that it is most important for regulators
to be able to evaluate the effects of their policies.
Table 1 shows the main variables employed in the various frontier efficiency estimations.
We specify the same four banking outputs and same four inputs in all of our frontier models,
whether estimated for a series of single years or pooled within a panel data set.  The outputs
are demand deposits, real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, and installment loans,
all measured in real dollar terms.  Production of services in these account categories is
associated with the vast majority of banking costs.  The four banking inputs specified are labor,
physical capital, small denomination time and savings deposits, and purchased funds.  The
parametric approaches use only the input prices, whereas our cost-based DEA techniques
specify both input quantities and prices.
19  In all cases, total costs -- operating expenses from
the physical inputs of labor and capital, plus interest costs from the financial inputs of time and
savings deposits and purchased funds -- are included to measure total cost efficiency.
The outputs and inputs chosen are fairly basic and standard, although there is
considerable variation within the literature, and many studies add other bank outputs (e.g., off-
balance sheet activities), other inputs (e.g., financial equity capital), other bank characteristics
(e.g., nonperforming loans), and environmental factors (e.g., state income growth) to the
models.  The specification of the cost function for the parametric models is also fairly basic and
                                                          
19The input prices are not directly observed, and so must be constructed from the available
information by dividing flows of expenditures by stocks.  The price of labor equals salaries and
benefits divided by the number of full time equivalent workers.  The price of physical capital is
expenditures on equipment and premises divided by the book value of physical assets, and the
prices of time deposits and purchased funds are the interest expenses on these categories
divided by the dollars in these accounts.  These procedures create data errors and likely
account some of the substantial variation in prices shown in Table 1.standard, a translog cost model with partially-restricted share equations.
20  As above, we
choose the most standard specifications from the literature, and are prevented by space and
time constraints from trying all of the interesting variations on our nine separate models in
evaluating our six separate consistency conditions.
21  We recommend that future research try to
verify or overturn our results with robustness checks using more and perhaps better
specifications of the outputs, inputs, and functional forms.
V.  Examination of the Consistency Conditions
The data presented in Tables 2 - 6 and Figures 1 and 2 provide direct evidence on our
consistency conditions for the nine efficiency techniques, arranged in order of the conditions.
Consistency Condition (i) -- Comparisons of Efficiency Distributions with Each
Other.  A number of distributional characteristics of the efficiency scores generated by the nine
efficiency techniques are reported in Table 2.  The mean efficiency from the seven SFA, TFA,
and DFA parametric models averaged .83 (with a mode of .84), while mean efficiency averaged
only .30 (mode of .21) across the two nonparametric DEA models.  The average standard
deviation of efficiency estimates from the parametric models (.06) was less than one-half that
for the nonparametric models (.14).
The level and time pattern of mean efficiency for each frontier method over our 12-year
period are displayed in Figure 1.  By assumption, the three DFA-P panel methods estimate only
a single “core efficiency” over time, and so yield flat lines by construction, but their levels can
still be compared with the other methods.  As shown, the parametric methods generally yield
relatively high mean efficiencies, between about 80% and 90%, that are reasonably close to
                                                          
20 The total cost function was jointly estimated with n-1 of the cost share equations with the
standard cross-equation Shephard's Lemma restrictions on the slope parameters imposed.
The intercepts of the share equations were allowed to vary to incorporate allocative
inefficiencies.  Berger (1993) found that efficiency estimates using no share equations, share
equations like this with the intercepts free to vary, and fully restricted share equations gave very
similar efficiency results.
21 Some recent frontier efficiency studies use more globally flexible functional forms, such as the
Fourier-flexible specification (e.g., Spong, Sullivan, and DeYoung 1995, Berger, Cummins, and
Weiss 1997, Berger and DeYoung 1997, Berger, Leusner, and Mingo 1997, Berger and Mester
1997, DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff 1998).one another in terms of level, and do not vary much over time even when data for separate
years (S) are used.  The only significant exception is TFA-S, which has mean efficiency of
67.4% and varies quite a bit over time.  It appears that using only 25% of the data from a single
year to estimate the cost functions adds significant noise to the model, but that this problem is
solved by using information from the other years, as indicated by the TFA-P results.
The most striking result from Table 2 and Figure 1 is how much lower the efficiencies
from the DEA approaches are.  The mean efficiencies from DEA-S and DEA-P are substantially
below the efficiencies from all the parametric methods.  This inconsistency between the
distributions of the DEA and the parametric distributions of efficiency is further illustrated in
Figure 2, which shows the cumulative distribution functions for the efficiencies from one panel
parametric technique (DFA-P GLS) and one panel nonparametric technique (DEA-P).
22  This
shows that the relatively low mean efficiency for the DEA methods is manifested in low
efficiencies for the great majority of the banks.  The nonparametric method identifies about 90%
of the banks as having less than 30% efficiency, while the parametric method suggests a much
closer correspondence of efficiency across observations, with almost all of the firms near 90%
efficiency.
23
These data suggest that the parametric methods are generally consistent with one
another in terms of the distributions of the efficiencies generated, yielding relatively high
efficiencies for the vast majority of firms and the nonparametric methods are generally mutually
consistent, yielding relatively low efficiencies for most firms.  The determination of which set of
methods may be more useful for regulatory analysis or other uses must wait for evaluation of
                                                          
22The maximum value for DEA-P efficiency shown in Figure 2 is less than 1.00 because it is the
average efficiency over time for each bank, and no bank was on the DEA panel frontier in every
period.
23It is also notable that the efficiency scores are generally not very strongly affected by the
choice of a single-year versus panel method or other differences in technique within each
approach, with the possible exception of TFA.  The nonparametric Chi-square and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests can be used to test whether a pair of samples share a common
distribution.  Both test procedures failed to reject the null hypotheses that each of the pairs
DEA-S and DEA-P, SFA-S and SFA-P, TFA-S and TFA-P, and DFA-P WITHIN and DFA-P GLS
belong to the same population.the other consistency conditions, particularly which approaches yield more realistic or
believable efficiency estimates.
Consistency Condition (ii) -- Rank-Order Correlations of the Efficiency
Distributions.  Although estimates of the levels of cost efficiency for the parametric and
nonparametric frontier methods are quite different across banks, it is still possible that these
methods will generate similar rankings of banks by their efficiency scores across frontier
methods.  As discussed above, identifying the rough ordering of which financial institutions are
more efficient than others is usually more important for regulatory policy decisions than
measuring the level of efficiency, so that regulators can determine whether regulatory-
influenced events like mergers result in improved or worsened financial institution firm
efficiency.  If the methods do not rank institutions similarly, then policy conclusions may be
“fragile” and depend on which frontier efficiency approach is employed.
Table 3 contains Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients showing how close the
rankings of banks are among each of the nine frontier methods using the full sample of banks.
The ranking for each method is based on the average efficiency value for each bank over the
entire 12-year period.  It would be expected that the rankings among all seven of the parametric
methods would be relatively high, since all of these methods essentially rank the banks by
teasing efficiencies from random error in  the residuals from similarly specified cost functions.
Indeed, the average rank-order correlation among these seven methods is .756, and all of
these correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level.  We would also expect a relatively
high rank correlation among the two nonparametric methods, since they also generate
efficiencies from essentially the same model.  Again, this expectation is justified, as the rank-
order correlation between them is a statistically significant .895.
However, the data suggests that the DEA and the parametric techniques give only very
weakly consistent rankings with each other.  The average rank-order correlations between the
parametric and nonparametric methods is only .098.  Ten of the fourteen correlations are
positive and statistically significant, two are negative and statistically significant, and two are notstatistically significantly different from zero.
24  Thus, the DEA and the parametric models cannot
be relied upon to generally rank the banks in the same order, and so may give conflicting
results when evaluating important regulatory questions.
Consistency Condition (iii) -- Identification of Best-Practice and Worst-Practice
Firms.  As discussed above, even if the methods do not always rank the financial institutions
similarly, they may still be useful for some regulatory purposes if they are consistent in
identifying which are most efficient and least efficient institutions.  The upper triangle of the
matrix shown in Table 4 reports for each pair of frontier efficiency techniques, the proportion of
banks that are identified by one technique as having efficiency scores in the top 25% that are
also identified in the top quarter by the other technique.  For example, of the banks identified as
in the best-practice 25% by DEA-S, 35.7% of these same banks were also identified as being in
the top quarter by SFA-S. This number also describes the proportion of the best quarter of firms
as identified by SFA-S that are also in the top 25% by DEA-S, since the number of banks in the
top 25% is always the same (171 of 683 banks).  Random chance alone would yield an
expected value of a 25.0% correspondence, and the value of .357 shown in the table is not
statistically significantly different from .250.  The same analysis with respect to the lowest
efficiency 25% of banks -- the “worst-practice” -- is shown in the lower triangle of the table.
Table 4 tells essentially the same story as the rank-order correlations above -- there is
very good consistency among the seven parametric techniques, very good consistency
between the two nonparametric techniques, but poor consistency between the parametric and
nonparametric methods.  Within the parametric techniques, the correspondence of the best
practice 25% of banks ranges from 49.1% to 93.0%, is always statistically significantly higher
than .250 at the 1% level, and averages a 69.3% correspondence.  Similarly, among the SFA,
TFA, and DFA methods, the joint identification of the worst practice 25% of banks ranges from
49.1% to 89.5%, is always statistically significantly different from random chance, and gives an
                                                          
24The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test can be used to test whether multiple samples are
drawn from the same population. Given the lack of consistency between the parametric and
nonparametric techniques, it is not surprising that a Kruskal-Wallis test rejected the null
hypothesis that the nine sets of efficiency scores all were drawn from the same distribution.average correspondence of 69.2%.  The two DEA methods identify the best- and worst-practice
quarter of the banks identically 76.0% and 74.9% of the time, respectively, and both are
statistically significantly greater than .250.
In contrast, the correspondences of the best-practice and worst-practice banks between
the two DEA methods and the seven parametric methods goes only as high as 37.4%, and is
below the random expectation of 25% in several cases.  For best-practice, the average
correspondence is 31.1%, and for worst-practice, it is 32.8%, and in no cases are the
correspondences statistically significantly different from .250.  Thus, although the parametric
methods tend to identify the same firms as efficient and inefficient and the nonparametric
methods are also internally consistent in this regard, the two types of approaches are not
consistent in their identification of the best-practice and worst-practice firms.  As a result,
regulatory policies targeted at either efficient or inefficient firms would hit different targets,
depending upon which set of frontier efficiency approaches were used to frame the policy.
Consistency Condition (iv) -- The Stability of Measured Efficiency Over Time.  As
discussed above, to be useful for regulatory policy purposes, it is important that the efficiency
measures demonstrate reasonable stability over time, and do not vary markedly from one year
to the next.  Although some banks may marginally improve or worsen their performance over
short periods of time, it is unlikely that a very efficient bank in one year would become very
inefficient the next, only to return to high efficiency in the following year.  Consequently,
measured efficiency by acceptable approaches should yield efficiencies which are fairly stable
over time, and regulatory policies targeted specifically at either very efficient or very inefficient
firms should still hit their marks after normal policy and implementation lags.
We now determine the year-to-year stability of the DEA, SFA, and TFA efficiency
estimates over time. The three DFA efficiency measures are excluded from this part of the
analysis because they measure only “core” efficiency that persists over the entire time period,
and so are perfectly stable by construction.  We calculated the Spearman rank-order
correlations for each of the six time-varying efficiency measures between each pair of years.
That is, we computed the rank-order correlation between DEA-S efficiency in each year i,i=1977,...,1987, and DEA-S efficiency in each year j, j=1978,...,1988, with j>i to avoid
redundancy, and then repeated this process for the five other techniques.  These 396
correlations were positive and statistically significant in all cases.  To summarize this large
amount of information in the most useful way, Table 5 presents the average correlations by the
number of years apart.  Each figure in the One-Year-Apart first column reports for a single
efficiency method, the average of the correlations of efficiencies in 1977 with 1978, 1978 with
1979, ..., 1987 with 1988, an average of 11 correlations in all.  Each figure in the next column
reports the average of 10 two-year-apart correlations, 1977 with 1979, 1978 with 1980, ..., 1986
with 1988.  In general, the n-year-apart figures are averages of the 12 - n correlations between
efficiencies that are n years away from each other.  It is these averages that would seem to be
most useful for regulatory analysis that must forecast the effects of their policies on firms in the
future.  For example, if it is thought that the policy and implementation lags are likely to take 3
years to work, then the three-year-apart average correlations may give the best indicator as to
whether the policy will hit the intended target banks.
The correlation coefficients decline over time, but remain surprisingly high and
statistically significant over all the available lags for all of the methods examined.  After three
years, the correlations are between 54.7% and 75.9%, suggesting that all the methods are
stable.  After eleven years, all the efficiencies still have statistically significant correlations
between 16.2% and 31.5%.  This suggests that many of the “worst practice” and “best practice”
banks tend to remain inefficient or efficient, respectively, over time.
25  All of the DEA, SFA, and
TFA methods shown seem to indicate this stability.  This also lends some support to the basic
assumption of stability that underlies the DFA approach.  Importantly, there is little difference in
the stability of efficiency between the parametric and nonparametric methods.  The only notable
                                                          
25 The stability shown in Table 5 is much longer than was reported by Eisenbeis, Ferrier, and
Kwan (1997) for a sample of large multibank holding companies over the period 1986-91,
where stability was statistically significant for about three and a half years.  DeYoung (1997)
found effectively an “optimal” stability of about 6 years for use in DFA analysis that struck a
balance between the benefits and costs of the extra information from adding a marginal year of
data.difference among the techniques is that the DEA methods generally show slightly more stability
than the SFA and TFA methods.
Consistency Condition (v) -- Consistency of Efficiencies with Market Competitive
Conditions.  As shown above in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2, the parametric methods
generally yield mean efficiencies between about 80% and 90%, with the vast majority of firms
having relatively high efficiency, whereas the nonparametric methods yield mean efficiencies
between about 20% to 40%, with the vast majority of firms
having relatively low efficiency.  It seems fairly clear that the parametric approaches are
generally more consistent with what are generally believed to be the competitive conditions in
the banking industry.  The relatively high efficiencies for the vast majority of banks seems
consistent with a reasonably competitive industry in local markets that allowed entry by branch
banking (recall that all the banks in our sample come from branch-banking states).  Moreover,
all of these firms survived branching competition over at least a 12-year period of economic
turbulence in the industry, which would be difficult to achieve for firms that consumed many
more inputs than the best practice banks.
In contrast, the DEA result that the vast majority of firms have measured efficiency of
less than 30% does not seem to be consistent with competitive conditions in this industry.  One
potential explanation of this finding is that DEA does not take account of random error as the
parametric approaches do.  As discussed above, the dispersion from random error would likely
result in lower average efficiency.  If there are a few firms with very “lucky” outcomes, the firms
that are compared to them may have very low measured efficiency by DEA, and this may have
occurred here, since the DEA efficiencies are so much lower than those generated by the
parametric models and so much lower than are likely to be allowed by market forces.  Note that
this problem likely is not as serious as a general concern as it appears here, since most prior
nonparametric studies of U.S. banks find much higher efficiencies, on average 12 percentage
points lower than the parametric studies, as opposed to the average differential of about 53
percentage points here.  In part, the DEA efficiency scores here may be lower than most of
those found in the bank efficiency literature,  because our cost-based DEA methods are basedon economic efficiency, rather than technological efficiency as most of the prior DEA studies
are.  As noted above, technological efficiency scores will tend to be higher than economic
efficiency scores because economic efficiency sets a higher standard that includes allocative
efficiency.  In addition, our DEA efficiency scores may be lower than those in most other DEA
financial institution studies because of the steps we take to reduce the self-identifier problem
(using input prices, specifying no extra constraints, and having a large number of observations
relative to constraints).
Consistency Condition (vi) -- Consistency with Standard Nonfrontier Performance
Measures.  As indicated above, efficiency measures should be positively correlated with
nonfrontier measures of performance generally used by regulators, financial institution
managers, and industry consultants.  Positive rank-order correlations with these measures
would give assurance that the frontier measures are not simply artificial products of the
assumptions made regarding the underlying optimization concept (technological efficiency
versus economic efficiency), the shape of the efficient frontier, the existence of random error,
and any distributional assumptions imposed on the inefficiencies and random error.  As also
indicated above, the
correlations between accurate efficiency measures and the accounting ratios of performance
are not expected be close to 1.00, since the accounting ratios embody not only the efficiencies,
but also the effects of differences in input prices and other exogenous variables over managers
have no little or no control.
Table 6 shows the correlations between the efficiencies generated by the nine
techniques and four nonfrontier measures of performance.  Both the efficiencies and the more
standard ratios are averaged over time to reduce the effects of noise.  The standard
performance measures are the return on assets (ROA), the negative of the total operating and
interest cost per dollar of assets (-TC/TA), the negative of total cost per dollar of revenue (-
TC/TR), and the negative of labor employed per banking office (-Labor/Branch).  The negative
signs are placed on the last three ratios to simply the discussion --  all four measures are
positive indicators of performance which should be positively correlated with frontier efficiency.These four performance ratios and other similar measures are what bank managers and
consultants use to generally assess their performance and rank themselves against their peers
within the industry.  The first three standard performance measures are indicators of economic
optimization in terms of bank costs and revenues, whereas -Labor/Branch is a measure of
technological optimization.
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The results in Table 6 suggest that the parametric-based efficiencies are generally
consistent with the standard performance measures, but the DEA-based efficiencies are much
less so.  Looking first at the DEA columns, only four of the eight correlations between the DEA
measures and the standard measures are positive and statistically significant at either the 5%
or 1% significance level, while two others are negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level.  The positive correlations are mostly fairly low, about 10% or less, with only one
correlation approaching 20%.  The two negative, statistically significant correlations suggest
that firms measured as efficient by DEA generally use more labor per branch, which is generally
considered to be a signal of poor productivity at the branch level by bankers and consultants.
Overall, the simple average of these eight rank-order correlations of .053 suggests that DEA
efficiency is at best weakly related to our banking industry indicators of firm performance.
For the seven parametric techniques, all 28 correlations are positive (although some are
barely so), 21 are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level and another is
significant at the 5% level.  The TFA frontier efficiency estimates are the most consistent with
the standard performance ratios, with all eight correlations statistically significant, and
averaging .218.  The results for SFA are similar, with an average rank-order correlation with the
performance measures of .205, but the correlations for -Labor/Branch ratio are only statistically
significant at the 10% significance level (10% level not shown in table).  For the three DFA
                                                          
26There may be difficulties with using the quantity of labor in this last ratio.  It has been shown
that the ratio of labor to costs has changed considerably over time (Berger and Humphrey
1992).  It has also been suggested that bank holding companies have moved many of their
operations into affiliates outside the bank itself, so that the labor input is consumed, but it is not
counted because it is employed elsewhere in the holding company (Berger, Kashyap, and
Scalise 1995).  This is likely more of a problem with measures of productivity growth than
efficiency, because it is a change over time, but it does introduce noise into our measure.  We
include it to have at least one measure of technological efficiency.techniques, the average correlation is similar, .199, but there is less consistency than the other
parametric measures, with 4 of the 12 correlations below 10% and not statistically significant.
   Overall, the parametric approaches, SFA, TFA, and DFA, are fairly consistent with the
standard nonfrontier measures of performance and are statistically significant and positively
correlated with these measures in the vast majority of cases.  This gives confidence that the
general method of teasing efficiencies from random error in the residuals from cost functions
does not do excessive harm to the data.  In contrast, there is a much weaker relationship
between the DEA nonparametric methods and these same firm performance measures.  Even
when the correlations are statistically significant, the magnitudes are generally much smaller.
This might occur in part because these methods may inadvertently count a substantial amount
of the random error as differences in efficiency.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper specifies a set of six consistency conditions that frontier efficiency
approaches to measuring the performance of financial institutions should meet to be most
useful for regulatory purposes.  The first three conditions -- that the efficiencies generated by
these approaches be consistent with each other in terms of their efficiency levels, rankings, and
identification of best and worst firms -- help determine the degree to which the different
approaches are consistent with each other.  The latter three conditions -- that the efficiencies
are consistent over time, consistent with competitive conditions in the market, and consistent
with standard nonfrontier measures of performance -- help determine the degree to which the
efficiencies generated by the different approaches are consistent with reality and are believable,
which is necessary for the efficiency estimates to be useful.  These consistency conditions
would likely be helpful for evaluating efficiency approaches for other purposes and for firms
outside of the financial institutions industry as well, and we encourage others to try applying
these conditions elsewhere.
We evaluate the extent to which all four of the main approaches to estimating frontier
efficiency or X-efficiency meet these consistency conditions.  We employ multiple techniques
within each of the four approaches, using single-period and panel methods, for a total of nineefficiency techniques evaluated.  To be sure that the applications are comparable, all nine
techniques use the same efficiency concept (cost efficiency), the same sample of banks, same
time interval, same specifications of inputs and outputs, and (for the parametric methods) the
same functional form.  Our data set consists of a panel of 683 large U.S. banks (assets over
$100 million) that were in operation over the entire 12-year period from 1977-88, and operated
in states that allowed branch banking.  This was a period of many regulatory changes and
many changes in market conditions, making it an almost ideal period to determine how the
different frontier approaches identify and measure bank efficiency over a variety of extreme
conditions.  It is also under such extreme conditions that it is most important for regulators to be
able to determine the effects of their actions on efficiency.
Our findings yield some mixed evidence regarding the consistency of the four main
approaches -- nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA), and the parametric stochastic
frontier approach (SFA), thick frontier approach (TFA), and distribution-free approach (DFA).
With regard to the first three consistency conditions, these data suggest that the parametric
methods are generally consistent with one another, and the nonparametric methods are
generally consistent with one another, but the parametric and nonparametric methods are not
generally mutually consistent.  The SFA, TFA, and DFA parametric approaches tend to yield
about the same distributions of efficiency (condition i), rank banks in roughly the same order
(condition ii), and identify mostly the same banks as “best practice” and “worst practice”
(condition iii).  While there is also consistency within the nonparametric DEA methods, the
parametric and nonparametric methods are not consistent with each other in these dimensions.
The DEA methods yield much lower average efficiencies, rank the banks differently, and
identify the best and worst banks differently from parametric methods. These results suggest
that there may be “fragility” in drawing regulatory policy conclusions that may differ according to
whether DEA versus the parametric approaches are specified.
Possible “tie-breakers” -- or conditions which may help choose whether the
nonparametric versus parametric methods might be “better” -- are whether the efficiencies
drawn from the different approaches are consistent with reality and are believable.  All of themethods are found to be consistent over time (condition iv), but the parametric methods appear
to be more consistent with what are generally believed to be the competitive conditions in
banking markets (condition v), and also more consistent with nonfrontier measures of bank
performance such as return on assets or various cost ratios that are often used by regulators,
managers, and consultants (condition vi).  SFA, TFA, and DFA yield relatively high efficiencies
for the vast majority of firms, consistent with the state of competition in banking markets,
whereas DEA yields relatively low efficiencies for most firms, perhaps reflecting the
confounding of random error and inefficiency in this approach that usually does not account for
random error.  In addition, the parametric measures are generally highly positively correlated
with the standard nonfrontier performance measures, whereas DEA measures are much less
strongly related to these other indicators of firm performance.
The data also show a high degree of consistency within the parametric methods and
within the nonparametric methods.  This tends to suggest that regulatory policy conclusions
may not be greatly affected by the choice of SFA versus TFA versus DFA, or by the choice
between panel and single-year techniques (with the possible exception of single-year TFA).
Rather, the only choice that appears to matter greatly for regulatory policy considerations is the
choice between the parametric and nonparametric methods, at least for this data set and these
techniques.
We hasten to add that these are the results of a single study, and no policy conclusions
should be drawn from a single evaluation of these consistency conditions.  Our results are
generally supported by past research, but there is still relatively little evidence on the
consistency conditions, and it is unknown how robust these results are.  For example, our
findings of very low efficiency for the DEA model is not very typical and may reflect our inclusion
of allocative inefficiency or something else about our specification or sample, so more
robustness checks are needed using alternative specifications and data sources.
As a final policy conclusion, our results suggest that when performing regulatory
analysis -- or really any other analysis that depends on frontier efficiency measurement -- the
use of multiple techniques and specifications is likely to be helpful.  If the six consistencyconditions are met for two or more approaches, then one can be more confident in the
conclusions drawn.REFERENCES
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6785700.65 3400066.25 1090526.00 12531125.00
Real Estate
Loans
323196.21 1215954.37 0.00 30159182.64
Installment
Loans
214890.11 637394.20 0.00 14155304.67
Commercial
Loans
755611.30 3780350.97 1306.88 66260201.77
Input Quantities:
Labor
2 1216.45 3971.48 12.00 79399.71
Physical Capital 32088.73 112207.91 495.32 66260201.73
Time Deposits 611615.98 1602807.47 605.65 35647871.59
Purchased Funds 1175298.34 6689270.60 2727.43 115298070.00
Input Prices:
Labor 24.07 5.30 8.47 121.75
Physical Capital 76.71 9.96 43.36 121.85
Time Deposits




0.08 0.04 0.00 1.73
1 All financial data are annual real values in 1000's of 1988 dollars, unless otherwise indicated.
2 Number of full-time equivalent employees.
3 Prices of financial inputs are interest rates.Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Efficiency Scores by Technique






Mean 0.385 0.210 0.875 0.879 0.674 0.808 0.855 0.933 0.779
Median 0.348  0.187 0.883 0.889 0.673 0.890 0.861 0.936 0.780
Mode 0.276 0.141 0.900 0.907 0.671 0.813 0.872 0.942 0.780
Minimum 0.103 0.054 0.471 0.479 0.309 0.622 0.546 0.783 0.548
Maximum 1.000 0.888 1.000 1.000 0.955 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Standard
Deviation
0.170 0.109 0.074 0.073 0.082 0.022 0.064 0.027 0.0835
Skewness 1.283 2.649 -1.043 -1.168 -0.274 -0.601 -0.779 -1.195 -0.116
Kurtosis 1.942 10.238 2.685 2.972 1.389 17.363 1.485 3.462 0.271
Num. Banks  683 683 683 683 683 683 683 683 683
Notes: The efficiencies are calculated using 12 years of data for 683 banks (8,196 observations), and the numbers in the table are based
on the average efficiency for each bank over the entire sample period.
DEA-S       Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using a Single (S) year of data as a reference set.
DEA-P        Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using the entire 12-year Panel (P) of data as a reference set.
SFA-S        Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) allowing the cost function parameters to vary for each Single (S) year
of data.
SFA-P        Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) forcing the cost function parameters (other than the intercepts) to be
constant over the 12-year Panel (P) of data.
TFA-S        Thick Frontier Approach (SFA) allowing the cost function parameters to vary for each Single (S) year of
data.
TFA-P        Thick Frontier Approach (SFA) forcing the cost function parameters (other than the intercepts) to be
constant over the 12-year Panel (P) of data.
DFA-P        Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) forcing the cost function parameters (other than the intercepts) to be
constant
WITHIN over the 12-year Panel (P) of data, and estimating fixed-effect dummies for individual banks (WITHIN) to measure
inefficiencies.
DFA-P        Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) forcing the cost function parameters (other than the intercepts) to be
constant
GLS over the 12-year Panel (P) of data, controlling for serial correlation and estimating average residuals for
individual banks (GLS) to measure inefficiencies.
DFA-P        Distribution-Free Approach (DFA) allowing the cost function parameters to vary for each year of data, but
forcing
TRUNCATED the inefficiencies to be constant for an individual bank over the 12-year Panel (P) of data, estimated using the
average residuals, and truncating the extreme values by assigning slightly less extreme values (TRUNCATED).Table 3: Spearman Rank-Order Correlations Among the Efficiency Scores Created by Various Techniques
DEA-S DEA-P SFA-S SFA-P TFA-S TFA-P DFA-P DFA-P DFA-P
WITHIN GLS TRUNCATED
DEA-S 1.000 0.895** 0.150** 0.104** 0.104** 0.083* -0.135** -0.092* 0.154**
DEA-P 1.000 0.167** 0.140** 0.214** 0.174** 0.054 0.061 0.188**
SFA-S 1.000 0.976** 0.837** 0.876** 0.463** 0.550** 0.981**
SFA-P 1.000 0.849** 0.897** 0.495** 0.566** 0.964**
TFA-S 1.000 0.945** 0.651** 0.684** 0.889**
TFA-P 1.000 0.645** 0.701** 0.918**






Notes: To reduce the effects of noise, the rank-order correlations of the average efficiencies of the individual banks over time are
reported, although the correlations using the efficiency estimates from the separate years are quite similar.
*   Correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level, two-sided.
** Correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level, two-sided.Table 4: Correspondence of “Best Practice” and “Worst Practice” Banks across Techniques
                     (Upper triangle shows “best practice” and lower triangle shows “worst practice”)







0.760** 0.357 0.339 0.310 0.304 0.187 0.211 0.345
DEA-P
0.749** 0.351 0.345 0.363 0.333 0.263 0.281 0.368
SFA-S
0.345 0.368 0.912** 0.743** 0.790** 0.491** 0.526** 0.930**
SFA-P
0.298 0.316 0.877** 0.743** 0.795** 0.509** 0.521** 0.906**
TFA-S
0.304 0.374 0.725** 0.719** 0.854** 0.567** 0.602** 0.778**
TFA-A
0.322 0.368 0.778** 0.790** 0.854** 0.591** 0.632** 0.813**
DFA-P
WITHIN
0.240 0.374 0.491** 0.521** 0.661** 0.597** 0.825** 0.503**
DFA-P
GLS
0.257 0.345 0.532** 0.544** 0.673** 0.620** 0.778** 0.526**
DFA-P
TRUNCATED
0.322 0.357 0.895** 0.854** 0.760** 0.819** 0.509** 0.544**
Notes: Each number in the upper triangle are the proportion of banks that are identified by one technique as having efficiency scores in
the most efficient 25% of banks that are also identified in the most efficient 25% by the other technique.
Each number in the lower triangle is the proportion of banks that are identified by one technique as having efficiency scores in the least
efficient 25% of banks that are also identified in the least efficient 25% by the other technique.
*   Correspondence is statistically significantly different from 0.250 at the 5% level by  
2 test.
** Correspondence is statistically significantly different from 0.250 at the 1% level by  



































0.920 0.815 0.723 0.640 0.575 0.520 0.484 0.436 0.377 0.354 0.313
DEA-P 0.944 0.850 0.759 0.679 0.614 0.561 0.514 0.468 0.419 0.367 0.315
SFA-S 0.855 0.703 0.581 0.472 0.400 0.347 0.299 0.276 0.260 0.252 0.231
SFA-P 0.864 0.710 0.583 0.466 0.378 0.312 0.258 0.223 0.194 0.175 0.162
TFA-S 0.829 0.664 0.547 0.439 0.372 0.323 0.268 0.202 0.242 0.228 0.200
TFA-P 0.875 0.740 0.628 0.520 0.450 0.386 0.328 0.293 0.258 0.251 0.252
Notes: Each entry in the table is the average of the correlations of the n-year apart efficiencies for a single efficiency technique within our
12-year time span, so for each n, the number reported is the average of 12 - n correlations.  For example, there are 9 different correlations
for the 3-year apart correlations -- 1977 with 1980, 1978 with 1981, ..., 1985 with 1988.  All 396 of the individual correlations that used in
the averages are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level, two-sided.
The three DFA efficiency measures are excluded from this table because they measure only “core” efficiency that persists over the entire
time period, and so are perfectly persistent by construction.Table 6: Efficiency Correlations with Standard Nonfrontier Performance Measures







0.109* 0.026 0.235** 0.229** 0.125** 0.169** 0.007 0.019 0.232**
-TC/TA
0.102* 0.196** 0.220** 0.224** 0.339** 0.342** 0.290** 0.285** 0.264**
-TC/TR
0.115** 0.067 0.285** 0.282** 0.215** 0.258** 0.095* 0.072 0.291**
-Labor/
Branch
-0.100* -0.092* 0.078 0.083 0.160** 0.137** 0.357** 0.411** 0.068
Notes: To reduce the effects of noise, the rank-order correlations of the average efficiencies and average standard nonfrontier performance
measures of the individual banks over time are reported, although the correlations using the efficiency estimates from the separate years are
quite similar.
*   Correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level, two-sided.
** Correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level, two-sided.
ROA                     return on assets
-TC/TA                negative of total costs/total assets
-TC/TR                negative of total costs/total revenues
-Labor/Branch     negative of number of employees per banking officeSheet1
















































Figure 2: The Cumulative Distributions of the DFA-P GLS and DEA-P Scores
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